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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of the Dutch R&D tax incentive scheme on the wages of 
R&D workers. We construct firm specific R&D tax credit rates that vary over time following 
variations in the Dutch R&D tax incentive program. Using instrumental variables we estimate 
a wage-sharing model with an unbalanced firm-level panel data covering the period 1997-
2004. The elasticity of the R&D wage with respect to the fraction of the wage supported by 
the fiscal incentives scheme is estimated at 0.2 in the short run and 0.24 in the long run.  
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1. Introduction 
Most OECD countries dedicate significant resources to support private R&D. Two main 
policy instruments are used for this: direct subsidies and tax incentives. R&D tax incentives 
seem to have gained in popularity recently. For instance, in 1996, 12 OECD countries offered 
R&D tax incentives, while in 2008 this number increased to 21 (OECD, 2009). This increase 
is partly due to the fact that the policy of fiscal incentives is more neutral compared to direct 
subsidies, in principle offering a tax relief to any eligible R&D expenditure.  
The usefulness of R&D support programs in general has been traditionally challenged 
for two reasons: government supported R&D may crowd out private R&D funding or get 
dissipated in higher R&D wages instead of stimulating real private R&D spending. Many 
empirical studies have examined the first question and often concluded that there is some 
additionality, in the sense that firms increase their R&D spending by more than the money 
they get from government in support of R&D (see Arundel et al., 2008; David, Hall and Toole 
2000; Hall, 2002; Hall and Van Reenen, 2000 for reviews of empirical studies).  
Surprisingly, the other key question, whether and to what extent government R&D 
support efforts dissipate into higher R&D wages as opposed to creating a R&D quantity 
effect, has remained largely unexplored.  A number of papers on the effectiveness of R&D 
support programs have included a price effect in their analysis (e.g., Aerts, 2008; Lelarge, 
2009; Haegeland and Møen, 2007; Reinthaler and Wolff, 2004), but most of these studies are 
concerned with direct R&D subsidies and not R&D fiscal incentives. Studies in labor 
economics have examined the effect of firm and employee characteristics on wages in general 
(e.g., Dobbelaere, 2004; Veugelers, 1989) but not specifically on the wages of R&D workers.  
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 The contribution of this paper is to examine the magnitude of the effect of the Dutch 
R&D tax incentive program, known as WBSO1, on the wages of R&D workers. By studying 
the price effect of the R&D fiscal incentive program, we seek to contribute to the policy 
discussion on the effectiveness of R&D support. We borrow from the stream of literature in 
labor economics to inform us on the specification of the wage equation. In our empirical 
analysis we use an unbalanced firm-level panel dataset constructed from the annual R&D 
surveys and production statistics from the Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands. The 
richness of the merged dataset allows us to construct detailed R&D tax disbursement as a 
function of R&D tax incentives, providing sufficient variation in both the cross-section and 
time dimensions to identify the effects of the tax incentive program on R&D wages.  
Our main empirical finding is that there is a significant price effect of the R&D tax 
incentive program on the wages of R&D workers in Dutch firms. After allowing for 
individual heterogeneity, business cycle fluctuations and the endogeneity of R&D tax credits 
we obtain estimates of the elasticity of R&D wages with respect to tax disbursements that are 
significantly different from zero. The point estimates of this elasticity range from 19% to 24% 
depending on whether static or dynamic models, short-run or long-run estimates are 
considered.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
the theoretical and empirical literature on wage determination and government R&D support. 
Section 3 lays out our empirical model relating wages to R&D tax incentives, describes our 
data set and explains how we constructed the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 
4 presents the empirical results and section 5 summarizes and concludes.  
                                                            
1 WBSO stands for “Wet Bevordering Speur- en Ontwikkelingswerk”, in full “Wet Vermindering 
Afdracht Loonbelasting en Premie Volksverzekering, Onderdeel Speur- en Ontwikkelingswerk” (see de 
Jong and Verhoeven (2007)), which translating literally means “Law for lowering wage taxes and social 
security contributions related to R&D activities”. This Research and Development (R&D) Tax Credit Act 
provides fiscal incentives for companies, knowledge centers and self-employed persons who perform 
R&D work. 
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2. Previous literature 
In this section, we briefly review the empirical literature on wage determination and the one 
on R&D government support.  Empirical studies on the effectiveness of direct and indirect 
R&D support aim at finding out whether firms substitute private R&D financing by direct aid 
or tax support, i.e. whether there is additionality or crowding out. The literature largely 
abstracted from the question of how much of the additional R&D is due to a volume effect 
and how much is due to a wage effect.  
Empirical studies that examine the price effects of government support programs are 
still scant. Reinthaler and Wolff (2008) on a panel of 15 OECD countries, Ali-Yrrkö (2005) 
for Finland, Üçdoğruk (2004) for Turkey, and Aerts (2008) for Flanders find evidence of a 
positive effect of direct R&D subsidies on R&D wages. As Aerts (2008) argues, this wage 
effect could be the result of an inelastic supply of R&D employees or the result of a skill 
upgrading, skilled workers earning higher wages than unskilled workers. The wage effect 
could even be higher for tax incentives that are based on R&D labor costs (as in the 
Netherlands), if firms try to maximize on R&D tax credits. Lelarge (2009) concludes for 
France that the Young Innovative Firms Program (JEI, “Jeunes Entreprises Innovantes”), 
which consists in payroll tax cuts for R&D workers in newly created SMEs, has a six times 
larger effect on wages than the conventional R&D tax credits. She explains this finding by the 
fact that young firms are more dynamic than other R&D-performing firms, and use these 
payroll tax rebates to retain their high-skilled researchers.  
Goolsbee (1997) is the first to have examined the price effects of tax incentives but in 
the context of physical capital investment. He argues that the low price elasticities of physical 
investment that are often found in empirical research can be explained by the fact that the 
short-run increased investment induced by tax incentives is mainly due to increases in the 
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price of capital goods rather than to increases in the quantity of investment. According to his 
estimates a 10% investment tax credit can increase the price of equipment by as much as 
3.5% to 7% in the short run. The inelastic supply of R&D workers, which increases their 
leverage in negotiated wage settlements, suggests that the wage effect of government R&D 
support can also be substantial.  Goolsbee (1998) has shown that these R&D wage effects are 
sizable. Using Current Population Survey data he estimates that a 10% increase in total 
federal R&D expenditure leads to a 3% increase in the wages of R&D workers in the US. He 
concludes that the price effects limit the efficacy of government intervention to stimulate 
private R&D in the United States. Romer (2000) argues that the US should worry about the 
supply of scientists and engineers rather than merely creating more demand for R&D, for 
instance by granting R&D tax credits. He illustrates why the supply elasticity to rising wages 
for scientists and engineers is not very high and therefore why the increased R&D expenditure 
resulting from demand shifters for R&D may increase R&D wages and not just the volume of 
R&D.   
Marey and Borghans (2000) apply a co-integration analysis using sectoral data for the 
Netherlands and report an average elasticity of R&D wages with respect to total R&D 
expenditures of 0.52 in the short run and 0.38 in the long run.  Haegeland and Møen (2007) 
estimate on Norwegian firm data that per Euro of R&D tax credit 33 Eurocent go into higher 
average wages for R&D personnel and that the wage effect is characteristic of SMEs. 
The empirical literature on wage determination in labor economics argues that wages 
are at least in part determined by the sharing in rents generated by efficiency wages, the 
employer’s ability to pay, features of the product market, trade liberalization and 
technological innovations (e.g., Abowd and Lemieux, 1993; Blanchflower et al., 1996; 
Hildreth and Oswald, 1997; Krueger and Summers, 1988; Van Reenen, 1996; Veugelers, 
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1989). Assuming risk-neutral preferences on the part of the employees, a version of the 
following reduced-form equation for the real wage rate W is usually estimated:  
 Z,,, wRfW    0 Rf , 0 wf , 10   ,               (1)   
where R is a measure of rents to be shared, w  is the alternative wage, Z is the vector of 
controls, and  parameter  ( 10   ) is the ‘sharing’ parameter to be estimated. It measures 
the fraction of the rent that accrues to workers in addition to their opportunity wage. If 0  
the entire rent accrues to the firm. If, on the contrary, 0  ‘sharing in rents’ occurs that 
increases the wages2.  
Previous studies have considered different measures of rents, such as profits per 
employee (Arai, 2003; Blanchflower et al., 1996), value added per employee (Dobbelaere, 
2004), and Tobin’s Q (Salinger, 1984; Van Reenen, 1996).  Parameter , as explained, can be 
considered as a constant to be estimated, but it can also be made heterogeneous and modeled 
to depend on variables such as sectoral unemployment rates, the price index, proxies for 
product market concentration (e.g., Dobbelaere, 2004; Veugelers, 1989). Van Reenen (1996) 
attributes rents to firms’ innovation output and R&D input.  
 In summary, the literature on R&D support acknowledges that part of the effect of 
R&D government programs may get dissipated in R&D wages. However, the empirical 
evidence on the magnitude of the wage effect is still scant.  In what follows, we explain how 
we quantify the wage effect of an R&D tax incentive program. The literature on wage 
determination provides a useful modeling framework to estimate the magnitude of the wage 
effect. 
 
                                                            
2 If 1 the worker would choose to set the wage rate equal to LR / , assuming the latter to be higher than the 
alternative wage. 
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3. Model and data 
Our hypothesis is that the R&D tax credits received from government partly accrue to R&D 
workers in the form of higher wages. There are various ways to justify such a price effect. 
Firms may share the R&D tax credits with their R&D personnel by offering higher wages to 
encourage their R&D department to apply for R&D tax credits. It may also reflect 
imperfections in the labor market for scientists and engineers, an inelastic supply on that 
market, the existence of search costs for scientists and engineers or bargaining power of the 
latter.  The point here is not that firms reduce their own R&D funding with government 
money (crowding out) but that the additional R&D expenditure is split into a quantity and a 
price effect. To test this hypothesis, we formulate an empirical specification of the wage of 
R&D workers that is partly determined by the R&D tax credits. We estimate the following 
equation for firm i at time t: 
 jtitititRit wSizeLKdW lnln)/(lnln ,  itjtZ d            (2)                             
where W is the R&D wage rate, d  is a measure of the R&D tax credit received,  LK /  is the 
capital to labor ratio, size is measured in number of employees, w is the alternative wage 
(proxied by the average sector R&D wage rate in industry j to which firm i belongs), Z is a 
vector of control variables, and i, j and t are respectively firm, industry and time subscripts. 
The parameter of interest  is the price elasticity of R&D wage with respect to the R&D tax 
credit.  
  To allow for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity in wages across firms and for 
common macro-economic shocks, the error term it  in equation (2) includes a firm-specific 
effect i , a year-specific intercept t , in addition to a serially uncorrelated measurement error 
itu : 
ititit u               for iTtNi ,...,1;,...,1   .  
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The firm-specific effect can also be replaced by an industry specific effect j  , .,...,1 Mj  , if 
heterogeneity is assumed to vary only across industries. Several studies have estimated a 
dynamic wage equation, with the lagged wage as an additional explanatory variable, 
justifying the persistence in wages by the slow adjustment of wages to external shocks (e.g., 
Hildreth and Oswald, 1997). Therefore, we have also estimated a dynamic version of equation 
(2), which yields both short- and long-run price effects. To estimate such a model we have 
used the more efficient system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
 
We use two data sources both supplied by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics. The annual 
R&D surveys contain information on the type and the amount of R&D expenditure and the 
census data on production statistics contain information on output and labor, as well as sector 
output deflators. We merge the two data sources using a unique firm identification number. 
These data sources and the process of merging them are explained in detail in Lokshin and 
Mohnen (2007). In the estimation we use an unbalanced panel of annual firm data between 
1997 and 2004.  
In this study we estimate a price effect for R&D workers, i.e. for only a small subset of 
all employees. The average number of R&D workers per firm is about 24 in our sample. If we 
consider only full-time researchers (and omit research assistants) the mean is about 12 
employees. In percentage terms R&D workers make up, on average in our sample, 7.8% of 
total employment in a firm (3.7% if we exclude research assistants). On average, across the 
years, the sector real R&D wage rate grew at 3.7% per annum, from an average of a little over 
20 €/hour in 1997 to about 26 €/hour. The standard deviation of the average sector wage rate 
is about 3. It actually decreased over time in our sample, mainly because the sample 
composition tilted towards larger firms. The cross-sectional variation of the firm wage within 
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sectors is large (average standard deviation of about 10) and accounts for most of the 
heterogeneity in wages.  
The R&D tax incentive facility primarily targets small and medium sized enterprises. 
Firms from all manufacturing and service sectors can participate in the program. In 2004 there 
was the following distribution of firms by sector: agriculture (6%), food (5%), chemicals 
(12%), machines (28%), other manufacturing (23%), ICT (11%), and other services (14%).  
This distribution has stayed more or less constant from 1997 till 2004 (de Jong and 
Verhoeven, 2007).  
In the empirical analysis the following industries are used with their standard 
industrial classification code (SBI) in parentheses: food, beverages and tobacco (15-16), 
textile, apparel and leather (17-19), paper and paper products (21), printing (22), oil (23), 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals (24), rubber products and plastics (25), non-metallic products 
(26), basic metals (27), fabricated metal products (28), machines and equipment (29), 
electrical products (30-33), motor vehicles (34-35), other manufacturing (36-37), construction 
(45), catering (50), wholesalers (50), retailers (52), communication (60-64), and business 
services (70-74).  
For all size classes the coverage has gradually increased from the inception of the tax 
incentives program in 1994 to the last year of our sample 2004, both in terms of the number 
of firms applying and the number of total applications by these firms. From 1997 to 2004 
there was a 29% increase in granted applications for the tax credits. 
When we split the number of observations in our sample in three categories of firm 
size we see that the distribution of our sample across size classes remains stable over time: 
12% have less than 50 employees, 62% have between 50 and 250 employees and 26% have 
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over 250 employees.3 According to SenterNovem, the administrative agency in charge of 
R&D tax incentives, 70% of the participating firms have less than 250 employees4. In our 
final sample the number of observations from firms in that size class is close to 75% of the 
total. Firms with fewer than 10 employees are not represented in our sample because the CBS 
does not collect data on these firms in their innovation and R&D surveys. 
The R&D cost composition of firms in the sample stayed reasonably constant over 
time. For instance, the share of the labor component is approximately 75% and remained 
more or less unchanged in the time period in our sample. 
Table 1 lists the main parameters of the fiscal incentives program for our sample 
period. For example, in the year 2004, there were two brackets: firms could deduct 42% of 
their R&D labor cost on the first 110 thousand Euros on R&D wage expenditure, followed by 
a 14% deduction rate on the remaining amount up to a ceiling of total R&D tax credits set at 
7.9 million Euros. There have been a couple of changes over time in the length of the two 
brackets and the corresponding rates of R&D tax credits. For example, in 2001 the length of 
the first bracket was extended from € 68,067 to € 90,756 and in the same year a higher 
additional first-bracket tax credit for starters (60% as opposed to 40% for the rest) was 
introduced.   
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
                                                            
3 We selected only those firms that performed R&D on a continuous basis, the so called ‘hard-core’ R&D 
performers because in odd years the CBS only collects data for ‘hard-core’ R&D performers. 
Participation in the fiscal incentives program by the ‘hard-core” R&D performers is very high, on 
average more than 95%. Therefore, we assume in our model that each firm eligible to participate in the 
tax incentives program makes use of it. 
4 The principal function of SenterNovem, now Agentschap.nl, is to process applications and to verify that 
the R&D projects submitted for approval conform to the regulations set for this R&D support scheme.  
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The dependent variable in our model, itWln , is the logarithm of the real R&D wage rate 
measured as the total real R&D labor costs per R&D employee. The total wage bill and the 
number of R&D employees are taken from the R&D survey. Wages are expressed in real 
terms, i.e. R&D and its components are deflated by a weighted average composed for 50% of 
the GDP deflator and for 50% of the R&D wage deflator. A similar approach is taken by 
Bloom et al. (2002). 
The key explanatory variable itRd ,  is a measure of the effective R&D tax credit rate 
that a firm can claim by participating in the fiscal incentives program. Using information 
about the R&D cost composition provided by the CBS and the parameters of the fiscal 
incentives scheme (see Table 1), for each firm and each year available in the sample we 
compute itRd ,  using expression A1 given in Appendix A. The expression for itRd , determines 
the average rate at which an R&D-performing firm can reduce its R&D labor costs by using 
the R&D tax incentives. We can use it to compute the amount of disbursement, in Euros, 
which a firm receives back from SenterNovem by simply multiplying itRd , by the firm’s R&D 
wage bill.5 The agency’s decisions are taken to be completely exogenous in our model, as 
they are in practice. For identification purposes it is important that there be sufficient 
variation in itRd ,  . Formula A1 indicates that this variation comes from several sources. First, 
there were a number of changes (taken to be exogenous) in the fiscal incentives scheme’s 
parameters. Such changes, reported in Table 1, occurred in every year except one within our 
sample period. The first bracket threshold increased three times, the rate applied to the first 
bracket increased three times, the rate applied to the second bracket changed five times and 
the ceiling changed twice. Variation of itRd ,  in the cross-section comes from two sources. 
                                                            
5 We implicitly assume that all R&D firms apply for R&D tax credits, and that the tax credits get paid 
the year in which the R&D costs are incurred. 
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First, the variation is determined by whether a firm applies for the standard or the preferential 
starter’s rate. Second, the effective rate of R&D tax credit depends on how high a firm’s R&D 
wage bill is. This potential source of endogeneity calls for an instrumental variable approach. 
We discuss estimation methods in the results section below. 
In models of wage determination the equilibrium wage is determined by internal as 
well as external factors. The latter can be thought of as an opportunity cost or as the current 
wage in other sectors of the economy (e.g., Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey, 1996; Van 
Reenen, 1996). The importance of controlling for the alternative wage depends on the extent 
to which the skills of R&D workers are firm or industry specific, i.e. substitutability of R&D 
skills within or across industries. It could be set to zero, an approach taken by Vandenbussche 
et al. (2001). Ideally, it should reflect the marginal productivity of labor (MPL) prevailing in 
each industry. MPL is difficult to measure in practice and we therefore follow the example of 
Van Reenen (1996) and include average sector R&D wage as a proxy for alternative wage. 
Alternatively, we could interpret our results as a premium over the industry wage determined 
by an (inelastic) R&D labor supply curve.  
Previous contributions found that wages are positively correlated with firm size and 
capital intensity. A positive effect of size on wages can arise as a result of collective wage 
bargaining at the industry level (Blanchflower et al., 1996; Forslund, 1994; Hildreth and 
Oswald, 1997; Holmlund and Zetterberg, 1991). Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) using 
a large employer-employee French panel dataset find that firms that pay higher wages are 
more capital intensive and productive. Given equal union status, several authors have found 
that there is a wage premium for workers employed by large firms. Large firms can enjoy 
more market power and be more successful in attracting higher-quality workers (Albaek et al., 
1998; Melow, 1982; Brown and Medoff, 1989).   
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We include K/L, the capital-to-labor ratio, as a control variable. According to Bronars 
and Famulari (2001) complementarity between capital and skilled labor will lead capital 
intensive firms to hiring more skilled workers (with a higher productivity of labor). When 
labor costs are negligible vis-à-vis the cost of capital, employers’ resistance to wage demand 
is expected to be smaller (Arai, 2003).  According to the efficiency wage theory, a higher 
capital-labor ratio can also lead to an increase in the cost of production and prompt firms to 
accord a wage premium to encourage their employees to reduce costs by improving 
performance (e.g., Akerlof and Yellen, 1986).  
To control for firm size we include ln Size, the logarithm of the firm’s number of 
employees. Brown and Medoff (1989) offer several explanations rooted in ‘compensating 
differentials’ as well as institutional theory for the positive correlation between firm size and 
wage premium. These factors capture the desire of larger employers to ‘follow a strategy of 
positive labor relations’ as well as their advantage over smaller rivals in attracting higher 
labor quality.  
Many studies have uncovered cyclicality of wages over the business cycle (see 
Abraham and Haltiwanger, 1995, for a review; Bils, 1985; Kean et al., 1988; Solon et al., 
1994). Cyclical wage movements can be the result of technology shocks shifting short-run 
demand curves against fixed supply curves or of movements along a fixed short-run labor 
demand curve6. We include controls for business cycle influences on R&D investment by 
using industry-specific business cycle indicators: for investment potential (i.e. solvability and 
return on total assets) and indicators for perceived competition, turbulence and economic 
                                                            
6 Bowlus et al. (2002) point out that this cyclical behavior of wages may be difficult to capture 
with aggregate data because of the potential compositional changes in a firm’s employment over 
the business cycle. In our case, such compositional changes are likely to be limited because we 
look at a specific narrow subset of a firm’s employment. 
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development. These time-varying business-cycle variables at the industry level are collected 
in vector Z in expression (2).  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the variables used in the estimation. A 
positive relationship is expected between the effective rate of R&D tax credit and the wage 
rate, if there is a price effect of the tax incentives program.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
4. Empirical results 
In order to get a feeling of a possible effect of the Dutch R&D tax incentives on R&D wages, 
we estimated the dynamic factor demand model for R&D from Lokshin and Mohnen (2012), 
where the R&D investment was regressed on the user cost of R&D and other control 
variables, by replacing the R&D denominated in constant prices by the R&D in current prices. 
In the absence of a price effect, the elasticities of real and nominal R&D to variations in the 
user cost of R&D, generated by changes in the R&D tax incentives, should be the same. The 
effect of R&D tax incentives on nominal R&D (via changes in the user cost of R&D) can 
hence be decomposed into a price effect and a quantity effect. We obtain a nominal short-run 
elasticity of -0.45 and a nominal long-run elasticity of -0.83, both statistically significant. By 
comparing these nominal effects with the estimated real effects (short-run elasticity of -0.42 
and long-run elasticity of -0.79), reported in Lokshin and Mohnen (2012, Table 4, last 
column), we arrive at a price effect of changes in the user cost of R&D of approximately 8% 
in the short run and 5% in the long run. On the basis of this result, we expect to uncover a 
positive price effect from R&D tax incentives from the estimation of our model specified in 
section 2, to which we now turn.  
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Table 3 reports the results of Equation (2). As a benchmark case, in column (1) we 
report the results from an OLS regression without firm-specific fixed effects but with industry 
dummies in which the R&D tax credit disbursement variable is treated as exogenous. The 
elasticity of the wage with respect to the effective R&D tax credit is rather small (0.06), yet 
statistically significant. In column (2) we report the results from an OLS regression with fixed 
firm-specific effects. The tax credit elasticity increases to 0.16 and becomes significant even 
at the 1% level. The individual effects are significantly different from zero. The Hausman test 
rejects the null hypothesis that the effective rate of R&D tax credit is exogenous ( )1(2  of 
8.91) and, therefore we proceed to an instrumental variable estimation. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 Column (3) reports the results of the IV estimation with firm fixed effects using the 
within transformation of the variables. The individual effects are treated as fixed as the 
Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of orthogonality between the regressors and the 
individual effects ( 02.0,39.29)16(2  p ). In addition to the contemporaneous real R&D 
deflator, which varies only at the industry level, we construct the instrument for the tax rate 
variable using information on firm’s R&D from a pre-sample period7, i.e. we compute 
݀௜௧ூ௏ிா ൌ ቄ݉݅݊ ቄ்௛௥௘௦௛௢௟ௗ೟ோ&஽೔భ , 1ቅ ൈ ܴܽݐ݁௧ቅ if firm i is eligible, and otherwise. We use ݀௜௧
ூ௏ிா  and 
the R&D deflator as instruments for  ݀௜௧ and then conduct the fixed effects regressions using 
data from periods 2 to T.  
We run a number of tests to check the validity of our instruments. First, we examined 
the fit of the first-stage regression, where the effective tax rate is regressed on all exogenous 
variables in the model including the excluded instrumental variables. The F-statistic, (F (17,  
                                                            
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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2355)  = 160.59) is higher than 10, satisfying the Staiger and Stock rule of thumb for non-
weak instruments (see appendix B). Second, we estimated the reduced form of the wage 
equation, this time regressing the log of the wage rate on all exogenous variables. The two 
excluded instrumental variables are significant and have the expected sign. The effective tax 
rate constructed from pre-sample information is positive and the R&D deflator is negative, the 
former stimulating R&D and increasing the R&D wage rate, the latter decreasing R&D and 
the R&D wage rate (see appendix C). The rank test of under-identification rejects the null 
hypothesis that the matrix of reduced from coefficients has less than full rank and hence 
points to the relevance of the instruments and to the identification of the model with those 
instruments ( 98.139)2(2  ). The F-test based on Shea’s partial R2 of the first stage 
regression has a p-value lower than 0.01. We also checked the Cragg-Donald statistic to test 
whether the instruments are weak in terms of relative bias (the maximum relative squared bias 
of the IV estimator relative to the OLS estimator) and in terms of bias in the Wald test size 
(whether the actual size of the test is at least some value b above the nominal level of the test). 
The Stock and Yogo test (Stock and Yogo, 2005) rejects the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are weak allowing for a 10% distortion in the size of the Wald test using IV rather 
than OLS. Furthermore, the Sargan/Hansen test statistic is small (1.32, with a p-value of 0.25) 
and therefore does not reject the validity of the instruments. We also checked whether the 
capital-to-labor ratio variable is endogenous and needs to be instrumented. The obtained C-
statistic (1.32, with a p-value of 0.24) is quite small, and therefore we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity of this variable.  
We find that the tax credit elasticity increases slightly from 0.159 in column (2) to 
0.21 in column (3) after instrumenting the R&D tax credit disbursements.  
Among the control variables, the capital-to-labor ratio is not statistically significant in 
the fixed-effects IV version of the model, the firm size and the alternative wage variables are 
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significant only at 10% when individual effects and the endogeneity of the tax credit are taken 
into account. Experiments with the quadratic terms of the capital-to-labor ratio and the firm 
size revealed that these coefficients are hardly significant. The business cycle variables are 
jointly significant in the estimation based on the within transformation of column (3).  
Several experiments were carried out to check the robustness of the findings. To check 
for the effect of changes in a firm’s employment structure, such as in its skill composition, as 
a result of tax credits, we estimated separate regression in which the ratio of the number of 
senior research staff to research assistants is the outcome variable. The tax credit variable was 
not found to be significant in this specification.8 This finding is in line with our hypothesis 
that the tax credit dissipates primarily in rents for R&D workers and does not lead firms to 
change the composition in their R&D workers (such as substituting low-cost workers by high-
cost workers).  
Previous empirical studies report significant differences in the ability of specific 
groups of workers to command higher wages (e.g. Black and Strahan, 2001; Nekby, 2003). 
R&D intensity and R&D wages could be correlated if R&D workers - scientists and engineers 
and R&D supporting personnel - constitute a relatively important group of workers within a 
firm. According to Sap (1993) the relative importance of a group can under certain conditions 
determine the bargaining power of this group. A higher R&D intensity ratio captures to some 
extent the importance of R&D workers within a firm. We added as an additional control 
variable the firm’s real, other-than-labor, R&D expenditures divided by total sales9. 
Controlling for the R&D intensity at the firm level could also be important if high-ability and 
                                                            
8 We did this using the same specification as in equation (2), just replacing R&D wage by the R&D labor 
composition as the dependent variable, and by using the specification proposed in Lokshin and Mohnen 
(2012) to explain the demand for R&D, what appears to us as a more satisfactory specification for 
explaining the R&D labor composition. In none of the specification was the rate of R&D tax credit 
significant. The results are not presented here, but are available upon request. 
9 We used other-than-labor R&D expenditures to avoid an obvious correlation with the dependent 
variable. Other-than-labor R&D expenditures are sufficient to control for total R&D expenditure if the 
shares of R&D cost components are pretty much fixed.  
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consequently high-wage workers systematically “sort” out into more R&D intensive firms. 
The coefficient on R&D intensity was, however, not significant at the conventional levels of 
significance, suggesting that there is not systematic “sorting out”.  
Several previous studies have estimated a dynamic version of equation (2) justifying 
wage persistence by, for example, the slow adjustment of wages to external shocks (e.g., 
Hildreth and Oswald, 1997). We therefore also estimated a dynamic version of equation (2) 
by including a lagged wage term on the right-hand side. In a dynamic model the “within” 
estimator leads to inconsistent estimates. To overcome this problem we used the system 
GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The estimates from the dynamic model are 
presented in column (7) of Table 3. We used as instruments the two period lagged values of 
the wage rate and of the effective rate of R&D tax credit in addition to the contemporaneous 
values of the exogenous variables. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions does not 
reject the validity of the instruments (the p-value is 0.14). The Arellano-Bond auto-correlation 
(AR) test applied to the differenced residuals of the GMM estimation indicates that there is no 
serial correlation in the error terms as the AR(2) test is insignificant10. The estimated 
coefficient on the lagged wage variable is 0.21 (with a standard error of 0.05), suggesting that 
wages adjust by 80% to their desired level within one year. The R&D tax credit elasticity of 
the average R&D wage is estimated at 0.188 (with a standard error of 0.045). These values 
imply a statistically significant long-run elasticity of R&D wages with respect to the R&D tax 
credit rates of 0.2411.  
We conclude that R&D tax incentives get partly dissipated in wages for R&D workers 
instead of contributing to additional R&D. If we compare the 0.2 wage elasticity estimated 
                                                            
10 We note that first-order autocorrelation, AR(1), in the differenced residuals occurs by construction. 
11 The long-term elasticity of wages with respect to the rate of R&D tax credit is computed, 
conventionally, as the short-run elasticity of wages with respect to that rate divided by one minus the 
coefficient on the lagged wage variable.  
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here to our 0.79 elasticity of R&D stock reported in Lokshin and Mohnen (2012), then we can 
say that the real effect of R&D tax incentives and the ensuing bang for the buck could be 
could be higher by a magnitude of 25%, if there was no wage effect. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
This paper examines the price effect of the Dutch R&D tax incentive program aimed at 
stimulating R&D expenditures in business firms. Fiscal incentives are the main policy 
instrument in the Netherlands to promote R&D by granting firms deductions from their social 
security contributions proportionately to their annual R&D wage bill. A recent evaluation of 
the fiscal incentives program concluded that it was effective in stimulating business R&D 
(Lokshin and Mohnen, 2012). This paper provides micro-level econometric evidence that 
there is also a wage effect related to the R&D tax incentives program. Part of the R&D tax 
credits get transmitted into higher R&D wages because of inelastic labor supply, search costs 
for scientists and engineers, incentives given to R&D employees, or bargaining power of 
R&D employees.  
To estimate the magnitude of the price elasticity we exploit a rich unbalanced firm-
level panel data set covering the years 1997-2004. We estimate a model sharing-in model 
where the average R&D wage depends on the effective rate of R&D tax credit, the alternative 
industry wage, and several firm and industry specific control variables. We allow for 
individual heterogeneity, and we correct for the endogeneity of the effective rate of R&D tax 
credit and for the dynamic panel bias when we estimate a dynamic version of the model.  The 
estimated elasticity of the average R&D wage with respect to the effective rate of R&D tax 
credit is significantly different from zero and of the order of 0.2, with little difference between 
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the short-run and the long-run effect because the average wage adjusts quickly to its optimal 
value.  
Our estimates of the wage effects are somewhat smaller than those found by Goolsbee 
(1998) for the U.S. and by Marey and Borghans (2000) for the Netherlands. This difference 
could be due to two reasons. First, the level of aggregation is different. Goolsbee (1998) 
works at the aggregate level and Marey and Borghans (2000) at the sector level. At a higher 
level of aggregation, spillovers are more likely to be present and produce extra pressure on the 
wage rates of R&D workers. The other reason is that we only consider R&D tax incentives 
and not total government R&D or total private and public R&D. Tax incentives are more 
neutral compared to direct R&D subsidies or R&D performed in government labs, which are 
more focused and may require a certain type of R&D workers with a relatively more inelastic 
supply.  It is worth mentioning that our results of the price effect of R&D tax incentives are in 
line with the findings reported in the labor literature on wage determination. Hildreth and 
Oswald (1997) estimated an elasticity of wages with respect to profits per worker of about 4% 
using firm-level data. Abowd and Lemieux (1993) report an elasticity of about 20%. Van 
Reenen (1996) applied three different measures of rents created through product innovation 
(profits per head, Tobin’s Q and the difference between real sales per worker and average 
industry wage) to examine the impact of innovation induced rents on wages on a panel of 
British firms. He reports an elasticity of wages to innovation rents of about 0.29 for the quasi-
rent measure, 0.05 for the profits per head measure and 0.04 for Tobin’s Q rent measure.   
Our findings have a number of policy implications. The existence of a wage effect of 
R&D tax credits suggests that the efficiency of the R&D tax incentive program could be 
enhanced if the wage effect could be avoided. What goes into higher wages for scientists and 
engineers could go into more real expenditures on research and development. We estimate the 
wage effect to reduce the quantity effect and the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives by some 
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25 percent. On the other hand, higher wages might be the price to pay to retain high-skilled 
researchers with promising returns in the future.  
There are a number of limitations in our approach. The model presented in this paper 
assumes a constant disbursement parameter across all R&D workers. A more refined analysis, 
which would allow this parameter to differ across R&D workers, could not be performed 
because of the lack of data on individual-specific wages. This issue could be addressed in the 
future when the Central Bureau of Statistics makes it possible to link firm and individual-
specific data. Relying on aggregated firm data does not allow us to control for differences in 
R&D workers’ characteristics such as seniority and schooling. Inability to control for 
individual worker characteristics amounts to an omitted variables bias (see Abowd et al., 
1999, for discussion). The aggregation bias is mitigated if R&D incentives affect all R&D 
workers of a firm, which is the case in our data.  
Other interesting avenues for future research are the comparison of the wage effects of 
different instruments for stimulating R&D, such as direct and indirect measures of support 
and the competition for R&D talent between countries. Other instruments, such as educational 
policies and open-emigration policies as a way to decrease the inelastic supply of talents are 
worth investigating but remain outside the scope of this paper.  
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Table 1 Overview of the fiscal incentives scheme parameters 
 
Year Program budget 
(in mln. Euro) 
Length of the first 
bracket  (in Euro) 
% First  
bracket rate 
% Second 
bracket rate 
Ceiling  
(in mln. Euro) 
1996 253 68067 40 12.05 4.5 
1997 274 68067 40 12.5 6.8 
1998 372 68067 40 17.5 6.8 
1999 353 68067 40 13 6.8 
2000 365 68067 40 13 6.8 
2001 435 90756 40 or 60 (s) 13 7.9 
2002 464 90756 40 or 70 (s) 13 7.9 
2003 425 90756 40 or 60 (s) 13 7.9 
2004 466 110000 40 or 60 (s) 14 7.9 
 
 
Table 2 Variable constructions and descriptive statistics  
 
Variable Construction Mean Standard 
Deviation  
 
Variables at the firm level 
Wage rate Total wage bill divided by the number of hours 21.58 12.15 
Capital-labor ratio Capital stock divided by the number of employees 
(in 1000 Euros per employee)  
 12.86 19.12 
Firm size Number of employees 290.82 567.55 
Effective R&D tax 
credit rate  
Percent of R&D labor cost supported by 
government, computed as in (A1) 
0.24 0.09 
 
Variables at the industry level 
Alternative wage Average sector R&D wage rate 23.44 2.93 
Investment potential: 
solvability  
Average solvability at industry level 36.14 11.21 
Investment potential: 
return  
Average return on total assets at industry level 2.75 7.37 
Perceived 
competition  
Index scaled between 0 (perceived competition is 
very low) and 100 (very high). Mean perception of 
competition by entrepreneurs at industry level   
45.60 2.06 
Turbulence  Ratio of new entrants over exits and spin-offs  at 
industry level 
11.60 3.20 
Turnover  Annual mutation of added value at industry level 6.44 3.71 
Note: The descriptive statistics are sample means for the years 1997-2004. The industry level data other than the 
alternative wage were provided to us by EIM. 
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Table 3 Static and dynamic estimates of the wage equation (2) 
 Rate of R&D tax credit treated as 
exogenous 
Rate of R&D tax credit treated as 
endogenous 
 OLS on pooled 
data 
With firm fixed 
effects (within) 
IV with firm 
fixed effects 
(within) 
System  
GMM 
 
Dependent variable Log(Wage rate) Log(Wage rate) Log(Wage rate) Log(Wage rate) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Effective rate of R&D tax 
credit  
0.058** 
(0.013) 
0.159*** 
(0.001) 
0.210*** 
(0.050) 
0.188*** 
(0.045) 
Capital-labor ratio * 10-2 0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
Firm size (in logs)  0.045*** 0.031* 
(0.018) 
0.031* 
(0.018) 
0.045*** 
(0.008) 
Alternative wage  -0.001 
(0.002) 
0.100 
(0.062) 
0.097* 
(0.058) 
0.002 
(0.055) 
Lagged wage rate - - - 0.207*** 
(0.054) 
Business cycle controls  Included Included Included Included 
Industry dummies Included - - Included 
R2 0.23 0.24 0.23 - 
F-test of significance of 
individual effects 
- 5.97 
(0.00) 
4.77 
(0.00) 
- 
F-test of Shea’s partial R2 
of instruments 
-  
- 
833.10 
(0.00) 
- 
Sargan/Hansen test   
(p-value) 
-  
- 
1.32 
(0.25) 
62.01 
(0.14) 
AR (1) test, (p-value) - - - -6.52 (0.00) 
AR (2) test, (p-value) - - - 0.95 (0.34) 
No. of firms 873 873 873 873 
No. of observations 3245 3245 3245 3245 
Notes: Estimation period is 1997-2004. Robust standard errors (clustered at the level of firm) are in parentheses. 
All models include time dummies. 
*** Indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% level.  
 
  
27 
 
Appendix A: Construction of the effective R&D tax credit in the Netherlands  
 
The Dutch fiscal incentives scheme (WBSO) is a contribution towards R&D labor costs. Firms are 
entitled to a reduction in social security contributions for the R&D labor cost. The scheme has two 
brackets and a ceiling. The parameters of this program are given in table 1.We measure the effective 
R&D tax credit for firm i  , Ritd ,  by the fraction of the private R&D labor expenditure that is supported 
by the tax incentive program. It is given by the following expression  
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where  
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1
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1
1 )1(       
1itc  if 1LititLit RRw  , else 0itc  
L
itw = percentage of labor costs in total R&D 
11 itD  if R&D is eligible 
12 itD  if the starters facility regulation can be applied  
:11it  first bracket rate for firms non eligible for the starters facility regulation 
:12it  first bracket rate for firms eligible to the starter’s facility regulation 
:2it  second bracket rate, which is the same for starters and non-starters 
:1LitR  first bracket ceiling (in terms of deductible R&D labor costs)  
2
LitR :  second bracket ceiling (in terms of reduced labor taxes) 
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Appendix B: First stage estimates of the effective rate of R&D tax credit Ritd  in column (3) of 
table 3 
 
Dependent variable Log(effective rate of R&D 
tax credit) 
  
݀௜௧ூ௏ிா 0.210*** 
(0.050) 
R&D deflator -0.079* 
(0.045) 
Capital-labor ratio * 10-2 -0.001 
(0.001) 
Firm size (in logs)  -0.052* 
(0.021) 
Alternative wage  0.089 
(0.071) 
Business cycle controls  Included 
R2 0.61 
F-test (17, 2355)    160.59 
No. of firms 873 
No. of observations 3245 
 
Appendix C: Reduced form estimation of the wage equation (2) with the excluded instrumental 
variables 
 
Dependent variable Log(Wage rate) 
  
݀௜௧ூ௏ிா 0.171*** 
(0.044) 
R&D deflator -0.052* 
(0.030) 
Capital-labor ratio * 10-2 0.001 
(0.002) 
Firm size (in logs)  0.019 
(0.021) 
Alternative wage  0.112 
(0.058) 
Business cycle controls  Included 
R2 (within) 0.24 
No. of firms 873 
No. of observations 3245 
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